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Country - USA. Writed by - Jeffrey Kluger. 1995. Star - Bill Paxton. director - Ron Howard. Me turning on low power mode while my phone's at 3 percent. Apollo 13 online free. HI. I immediately went to 5 minutes before ground asked Appollo 13 to stir the tanks. Then I waited for the animation of the panel to blow and the fameous statement to the effect 'Houston we've had a problem' or something like that. I noticed the panel blow, some type of gas being vented and I expected the spacecraft to start a slow tumble but did not. Are you animating the Apollo in a coordinate system fixed to the assemby. I think I saw Moon and the Sun moviing in background which means yes.
Apollo 13 Summary From the Apollo Lunar Surface Journal. Reproduced with the permission of Journal editor Eric M. Jones Table of Contents Mission Profile Animations The Frustrations of Fra Mauro: Part I The Fra Mauro Landing Site A Pretty Big Bang Survival Getting Home The Cause of the Accident Launched: April 11, 1970 Lunar flyby and return Malfunction forced cancellation of lunar landing Returned to Earth: April 17, 1970 Command Module: Odyssey Lunar Module: Aquarius Crew James A. Lovell, Jr., commander John L. Swigert, Jr., command module pilot Fred W. Haise, Jr., lunar module pilot Launch of Apollo 13. "Houston, We've Got a Problem... ". Carbon Dioxide Problem & Fix. Apollo 13 Damage to the Service Module. Apollo 13 Splash-Down. The first two Apollo crews landed out on the smooth lunar mare, the lava seas that formed relatively late in the Moon's history. Both crews proved that, once the Commander took over control at an altitude of about 500 feet, he could move his landing spot by several hundred feet. After two landings out on the mare, NASA was ready for a visit to a site where landing accuracy promised insight into the history of the older parts of the Moon. About half of the lunar Nearside - and virtually all of the Farside - is covered by heavily-cratered highlands, the light-colored regions which, as seen from Earth, contrast so strongly with the darker-colored mare. Because the mare rocks are relatively young and cover far less than half of the lunar surface, the scientific community needed highlands samples if they were going to understand lunar geology. To be sure, the Apollo 11 and 12 collections contained significant numbers of small rock fragments which differed markedly in composition from the bulk of the mare-derived materials; and there was every reason to believe that many of these "exotic" fragments represented ejecta from impacts in the distant highlands. However, while studies of these fragments produced plausible data on the general age and mineral content of highlands materials, there was no real substitute for taking a look at in-place samples of highlands bedrock. Although NASA was not ready to commit a LM to a landing in really rugged terrain, the site selection committee had long been interested in a place called the Fra Mauro Hills, a small, relatively benign bit of highlands country sitting like a low island out in the middle of the Ocean of Storms. Of particular interest was a feature called Cone Crater, a comparatively fresh crater about 300 meters across. The Fra Mauro Hills are believed to be part of the extensive ejecta blanket laid down by the impact that formed the huge Imbrium Basin; and Cone Crater had been dug into a ridge of this material. Although the area is covered by materials derived from post-Imbrium events- such as ejecta from the large, young crater Copernicus some 500 kilometers to the north and, as well, materials dug out of the immediately surrounding mare by countless other impacts - Cone Crater was big enough that the astronauts would surely find Imbrium ejecta as they climbed toward the rim. From an operational point of view, Fra Mauro offered some additional challenges and opportunities. Because the crew needed a relatively flat place on which to land, they would have to touch down more than a kilometer away from Cone and then walk to the rim. During the last half of the approach, the astronauts would have to climb a grade of about one in ten and the traverse promised to be a significant test of astronaut mobility. In terms of lunar surface activities, the Fra Mauro mission was far more ambitious than either of the other landings and, unfortunately, it took two tries to complete. Jim Lovell, Jack Swigert, and Fred Haise - the crew of Apollo 13 - set out on the first mission to Fra Mauro; but a spacecraft accident forced them to abort the attempt before they ever got to the Moon. Indeed, they were lucky to get home at all. For years, NASA had concentrated its energies on the obviously critical stages of missions: the launch from Earth, the departure from low-earth-orbit, lunar-orbit insertion, the landing sequence itself, lift-off, rendezvous, the departure from lunar orbit, and the fiery plunge through the Earth's atmosphere toward splashdown. Ironically, it was during one of the quiet times, during the long outward coast, that something went wrong. Apollo 13 was launched about five months after Conrad, Gordon and Bean returned from the Moon. There had been only a few minor glitches in the early stage of the mission and, through the first two days and into the early part of the third, the flight seemed to be defying the worst fears of those prone to a habitual state of nervous anticipation with regard to the number 13. At the time of the accident, it was about nine in the evening in Houston - on the 13th of the month, of course - and, on board the spacecraft, the crew had just finished a routine mid-flight TV broadcast. Commander Jim Lovell and LM Pilot Fred Haise were in the process of completing a checkout of Aquarius, their lunar lander; and CSM Pilot Jack Swigert was preparing to make some star sightings with his sextant. At fifty-five hours, fifty-five minutes into the mission, all three astronauts heard and felt a "pretty large bang". It got their immediate attention and, during the next few minutes as they and the ground controllers made a rapid assessment of the health of the spacecraft, it became apparent that, for some reason, two of the three fuel cells in the Service Module had gone dead. No one knew quite what had happened, but there was no doubt that the crew was in serious trouble. If they were going to survive, they would need enough power, oxygen, and water for a four-day trip around the Moon and home to Earth; and, without a healthy Service Module, those three commodities were going to be in terribly short supply. Under normal circumstances, oxygen and hydrogen were combined in the fuel cells to produce electricity and water; and, with both oxygen tanks rapidly losing pressure, even the remaining fuel cell wouldn't last long. In addition to short supplies of these basic commodities, without power in the Command Module, they would have to rely on the LM Environmental Control System to remove excess carbon dioxide from the cabin. The LM system contained two lithium hydroxide canisters - a primary and a secondary - which, together, had been designed to handle the carbon dioxide output of two people for about 30 hours, rather than three people for at least four days. The LM did carry replacement canisters, but most of those were safely tucked away in the MESA, quite hopelessly out of reach. Quite simply, they didn't have enough LM lithium hydroxide canisters to handle the load. And, finally, the crew was flying a trajectory toward the Moon that would not allow them to return to Earth without a major engine burn. The main engine, of course, was housed at the back of the Service Module and, with the power supply gone, the crew might as well have left the engine back at the Cape. The people of Apollo took great pride in their resourcefulness and in their detailed understanding of the flight hardware. If there was a way to improvise and get the crew safely home, they intended to find it. And as they looked over the situation - flight crew and ground personnel alike - they realized that they had been very lucky. As desperate as the situation was, the accident had come early in the mission. They still had a healthy, fully-stocked lunar module. The margin of safety would be tight, but the LM had an engine to put the crew back on a homeward path, and it carried enough - not a lot, but enough - water, oxygen, and power for the four days. And there were plenty of lithium hydroxide canisters in the Command Module and, while they wouldn't fit directly into the LM ECS - being the wrong size and the wrong shape - surely a way could be found to put them to use. Even in the earliest days of Apollo, during 1962 when NASA was still trying to decide on a basic mission mode, proponents of lunar-orbit rendezvous had argued that, in certain circumstances, the LM engines could be used as backups in case of a Service Propulsion System failure. These "LM Lifeboat" scenarios were never studied in great detail, but enough people had given the general idea some thought - even to the extent of having run some flight control simulations - that, within an hour of the accident, flight engineers were busily calculating trajectories and burn durations, figuring out new navigation and flight control procedures, and refining estimates of just how long the critical supplies would hold out. Oxygen turned out to be the least of the Apollo 13 worries. The LM carried generous stocks - including the backpack oxygen that Lovell and Haise were to have used for their first EVA at Fra Mauro. In order to conserve their own physical resources - and to minimize their carbon dioxide output - the crew would do their best to keep physical exertion to a minimum. Nonetheless, it was reassuring to know that they would only have to use about half of their oxygen stock in getting home. The power and water supplies were far more critical. A significant fraction of the electric energy stored in the LM batteries would have to be used during the engine burn and, if the astronauts were to survive the trip back to Earth, they would have to carefully conserve the remainder. All non-essential electronics would have to be turned off and that promised to make the trip home a damp and chilly one. Of even greater concern was the fact that, at first blush, there seemed to be no way to keep the Command Module batteries charged until they would be needed for re-entry. Under normal circumstances, the fuel cells in the Service Module were used to keep the CM batteries charged and then, only in the last few hours of the mission, once the Service Module had finished its job and was jettisoned, were they brought on line. Unfortunately, the accident had killed the fuel cells and, unless a way could be found to use the LM batteries to maintain a charge, the crew would have no way to control their re-entry and would perish just as surely as if they had crashed into the Moon. The problem in maintaining a charge on the Command Module batteries was only one electrical path between the LM and the Command Module and that was a sensor circuit which, as Fred Haise remembers it, allowed the crew to monitor power usage by the LM systems. Because the LM and the CSM had no physical or electrical connections during launch from earth, the monitoring circuit was established only after the crew had docked with the LM, removed the docking hardware from the connecting tunnel, and plugged in an umbilical cable. According to Jack Schmitt, "After the explosion on 13, somebody started working the schematics of the two spacecraft and figured out that they could configure switches and circuit breakers so that current from the LM batteries could be trickled over along this sensor circuit. And that's what they did for five days: trickle this current over to the Command Module batteries. Without it, they could never have re-entered (Earth's atmosphere). " By turning off as much of the electronics as they could, they not only saved power for the critical needs of the LM engine and the CM batteries, but also cut down on the use of water. Even with a normal ration of about a liter of water a day, the crew would have drunk less than ten percent of the 150 liters of water onboard the LM; however, even in a powered-down mode, virtually all of the 150 liters was needed for the sublimators that kept critical equipment cool, so the astronauts cut their daily ration to about a fifth of a liter apiece, a small glass full. They would be plenty thirsty when they got home, but at least they'd have a chance. As it turned out, they did a stunning job of conservation and got back to Earth with twenty percent of the LM power left and ten percent of the water. Indeed, in hindsight they may have done too good a job of water conservation. Lovell lost fourteen pounds (and Haise and Swigert another seventeen pounds between them) and they were all "tired, hungry, wet, cold, [and] dehydrated" when they landed. Because of the dehydration and other factors, Haise developed a prostate infection, a fever of 103 degrees Fahrenheit, and was seriously ill for two or three weeks after getting home. But all of that was of secondary importance. They had made it back alive. In large measure, the Apollo 13 crew survived their ordeal for the simple reason that, at the time of the accident, they had backup stores of critical commodities: extra power, water, and oxygen - and even an extra engine. Of course, had the accident happened while Lovell and Haise were on the lunar surface, or after they'd returned to orbit with rocks but no fuel nor anything else of immediate survival value, then the outcome would have been tragically different. But that was the nature of the venture. Acceptance of the Kennedy challenge dictated the acceptance of calculated risks. True, NASA had worked hard to build redundancy into the spacecraft systems; and it is a bit ironic that, at one stage of the drama, the team had to work hard to get around the fact that they couldn't simply interchange the CSM and the LM lithium hydroxide canisters. In both spacecraft, under normal circumstances, the cabin air was fed continuously through environmental control equipment where, among other things, lithium hydroxide reacted with the carbon dioxide and trapped it. A single canister began losing its efficiency after about 40 person-hours of use and then had to be replaced. Unfortunately - and quite literally - the square CSM canisters wouldn't fit into the round holes of the LM unit; and, unless a way could be found to use the square ones, the carbon dioxide content of the cabin air would rise to poisonous levels long before the crew could get home. The advertised 60-person-hour combined lifetime of two LM canisters was, of course, a very conservative figure and, in fact, by allowing the carbon dioxide levels to rise above normal limits, they were able to keep them on line for 107 person-hours, or nearly a day and a half. And they had one other primary canister - 40 person hours design lifetime, 80 person hours at the higher CO2 levels - that they were holding in reserve in case it took extra time to devise a way to use the CSM canisters. There was, of course, a fix; and it came in the form of an ingenious combination of suit hoses, cardboard, plastic stowage bags, and CSM canisters - all held together with a liberal application of grey duct tape. As was usual whenever the Apollo team had to improvise, engineers and astronauts on the ground got busy devising ways around the problem and then checked out the new procedures. A day and a half after the Apollo 13 accident, the ground teams had designed and built a filtering device that worked to their satisfaction. They promptly radioed instructions to the crew, carefully leading them through about an hour's worth of steps. As Lovell wrote later: "the contraption wasn't very handsome, but it worked. " And that was all that mattered. include a drawing and photo of the canisters from the Apollo 13 mission report With the solution of the carbon dioxide problem literally in hand, the crew of Apollo 13 looked to be in about as good a shape as could be expected under the circumstances. As long as the LM remained healthy, they had a good chance of getting home; and the odds certainly seemed pretty good. The design engineers had gone to great lengths to ensure LM reliability. Of course, the CSM, too, had been designed to be a reliable spacecraft; but two critical failures in one mission seemed a bit far fetched. In order to get home, the astronauts had to make two engine burns. The first came five hours after the accident and was designed to put them back on what was called a "free-return trajectory", a trajectory that would take them home even without the second burn. They were still headed toward the Moon and wouldn't reach it for nearly another day; but, with the first burn successfully completed, when they swung around the backside, lunar gravity would send them homeward rather than out into the depths of space. The second burn was needed in order to get them home before the supplies ran out. On the new trajectory they wouldn't get back to Earth for over ninety hours and calculations indicated that a trip of that length was only marginal, especially with regard to cooling water. The key to success was to wait until after the Moon had swung them homeward and then give themselves a good, hard kick in the pants and cut about nine hours off the trip. The first burn went smoothly and there was every reason to believe that the LM engine would function perfectly the second time as well. However, for this second burn, the crew had to take particular care to make sure that the engine was pointed in just the right direction and, because of the accident, they had to deal with some unusual navigation problems. Because they were traveling through vacuum, there was nothing to disperse the cloud of Service Module debris that enveloped the spacecraft. As they peered through the LM's one-power telescope trying to make star sightings, glints of sunlight reflecting off the debris made the job all but impossible. And to add to their difficulties, they were all exhausted and kept making uncharacteristic mistakes. But they kept at it and, with help from the ground, figured out how to use sightings of the Sun and the crescent Earth to verify their alignment and then did the job over and over to make sure that they had it right. When the time came, the burn was perfect. It was two months before NASA was satisfied that the causes of the accident were understood. As Lovell later wrote, the accident did not have a single cause but, rather, was the result of an "accumulation of human errors and technical anomalies that doomed... [the mission]. " The accident began, in fact, in 1965 when the design engineers decided to change the spacecraft power supplies from 28 to 65 volts. Normally, of course, such a change would cause a cascade of other changes as designers adapted their particular components to the new operating environment. However, the people building the innards of the Service Module oxygen tanks somehow never became consciously aware of the change. Each of the tanks contained a stirring fan, a heating element, and a temperature-sensitive switch designed to shut everything off if the element got hotter than about 25 degrees centigrade (80 F) and none of these components was ever redesigned to accommodate the higher voltage. NASA might have gotten away with the design flaw (as it had on Apollos 7 through 12) if one of the oxygen tanks destined to fly on Apollo 13 hadn't been damaged in 1968. This particular tank had originally been installed in the Apollo 10 CSM but, prior to that mission, was removed for modification. At some point, the tank was dropped about 5 cm (two inches) and because of its very thin walls, suffered noticeable damage. Another tank was installed in Apollo 10 while the original was set aside for repair and eventual installation in the Apollo 13 spacecraft. Tests run on the tank after the repairs indicated proper functioning but, in the weeks preceding the Apollo 13 launch, ground crews experienced significant difficulties draining it. In hindsight, it was at this point that NASA should have taken a hard look at the health of the tank but instead, all of the cognizant individuals - the crew included - concluded that the problem was not serious. Replacement of the tank would have delayed the mission - by a month at least - and, at the time, it seemed acceptable to try emptying the tank by running the internal heater for several hours. No one imagined just how serious a problem the procedure would cause. As we now know, the temperature-sensitive switch was not designed to operate at 65 volts. During normal operations, the heater was on for only brief periods and the switch never opened. However, during what proved to be a lengthy process of emptying the tank using the internal heater, the switch opened but, then, was immediately welded shut again by an electric arc driven by the high voltage. Indications that the switch had closed were missed. Subsequently, whenever the CSM was powered up, the heaters went into operation without the protection normally provided by the switch; and, at some point during pre-launch activities, the whole assembly reached a temperature of over 500 degrees Centigrade (1000 F). This was a high enough temperature to cause severe damage to the Teflon insulation protecting the fan-motor wiring and, as the Apollo 13 Review Board later concluded, "from that time on the oxygen tank was in a hazardous condition when filled with oxygen and electrically powered. " The stage was set for the accident. Despite all the rattling that must have gone on during the launch and subsequent engine firings, nothing untoward happened inside the tank until fifty-five hours, fifty-five minutes into the mission. At that moment, at a quiet time and, undoubtedly as a result of something so simple as the start up of the fan, the wires arced and the insulation caught fire. It was the 1967 Apollo launch-pad fire all over again, only this time it was a fire fed by a superabundance of pure oxygen, a fire that wouldn't quickly go out. The heat of the fire began boiling the liquid oxygen that mostly filled the tank and the pressure began to rise. Within a half minute, the pressure was too high for the tank's thin walls and they burst. The explosion wreaked havoc throughout the innards of the Service Module, rupturing the other oxygen tank and blowing out the side of the spacecraft. From a purely engineering point of view, the Apollo 13 accident didn't reveal any fundamental flaws in the Apollo design concept. In any project of such size and complexity, unforeseen problems are to be expected and, what the accident did was to underline the lessons of the Apollo fire: NASA needed to do a better job of identifying problems before they could happen. The agency needed to conduct another thorough review of designs and procedures, particularly with regard to components that came in contact with the oxygen supply and, in the future, to pay closer attention to design changes, manufacturing quality, and the implications of anomalous test data. But there was no need to go back to square one. From an engineering point of view, once the problem had been identified, the fixes were easily accomplished. True, the accident had cost NASA one of its now limited opportunities to complete a landing and had almost cost the lives of three astronauts; but when measured in terms of the engineering goals that had been set in the early sixties, NASA was still well ahead of the game. The main trouble with such accidents is that they have the potential of causing real political mischief. Although the death warrant for Apollo had already been signed in January 1970 - with the assembly lines shutdown and one of the remaining missions cut from the schedule for lack of funds - it is not coincidental that two more missions were dropped in the interval following the accident. Congressional support for Apollo had been weak for years and now there was a new President who was less than an ardent fan; and, while prediction of the political impact of serious accidents is far from an exact science, any accident was bound to raise questions about the credibility of NASA and its programs. As both the Apollo fire and the Challenger accident of the Shuttle era indicate, serious accidents do not necessarily doom a program but, given the expense and high visibility of such enterprises, the political risks are considerable.
Apollo 13 free online full movie. Frank Borman's investigative skill and perseverance during the Apollo 1 fire investigation was key to making the design and construction improvements necessary to get the Apollo spacecraft ready to fly. It was probably his most important contribution to the program even more than his flying on Apollo 8. This is probably Ron Howard's best film, which although that isn't saying much coming from me (not a fan. Apollo 13" is exceptional in its mission focus and sustaining the tension through the slew of problems with the historical voyage to the Moon. In celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon landing, I've been viewing a bunch of lunar and space-related pictures lately, and it's become quite apparent that making the most awe-inspiring and challenging feats people have ever accomplished into sustained movie thrills is not an easy task for many filmmakers. "Marooned" 1969) is an obvious precedent in this case. In fact, there's a nightmare scene here that is said to be based on Marilyn Lovell's real nightmare after having seen "Marooned." While the real disaster is that film itself, it's understandable that the disturbance of it would linger for an astronaut's wife. "Marooned" is a thoroughly inhumane and mechanical exercise where a NASA chief played by an unsympathetic Gregory Peck hardly cares for the lives of helpless astronauts stranded in space. To him and the picture in general, those men floating in a tin can are nothing more than a math problem that he's forced to try to solve because the President of the United States ordered him to; otherwise, his first instinct is that it's not worth it and to give up.
"Apollo 13" is still a series of mathematical and mechanical problems to be solved, but the astronauts are active participants in it, and most of the people at NASA actually care about getting them home. More than the famous line, Houston, we have a problem, much of the runtime involves continual communication and teamwork between the men in the sky and those on the ground. Whereas "Marooned" divorced the spectator from caring about the astronauts, either, by spending the first part of the film treating them as test subjects for seemingly how nuts they could make them with a long stay in space; Apollo 13" invests in making their pilots likable. Part of this is just casting proven, well-liked stars: Tom Hanks, Bill Paxton, Kevin Bacon and Gary Sinise. At Mission Control, they put in charge Ed Harris, the guy who played John Glenn in the most-respected prior NASA-related film to that date, The Right Stuff" 1983. So good so far, but Howard also spends the early part developing the domestic relationships of the Lovell family, which pays off when the film repeatedly returns to the family at home watching the drama in space unfold on TV. Compare that to the lack of dramatic connection of the conversations between the astronauts and their wives in "Marooned." The audience hadn't invested in those relationships or characters, so they didn't care. Here, anyone who knows a bit about recent history knows exactly how the story ends, but it matters because those characters and relationships have been built in the film.
It also helps that the visual effects here hold up well nearly 25 years later, while the blatant matte work of "Marooned" only compound its problems of a picture divorced from its characters. Many shots in "Apollo 13" were even shot in actual zero gravity. Thus, it's simultaneously a more dramatic and more realistic film. Unfortunately, when Howard was entirely untethered from the real world and offered a space picture based on a mythical cosmos with "Star Wars, it bombed. "Marooned. Solo" 2018) and a host of other movies: those are disasters. "Apollo 13" is a triumph.
Free Online Apollo 13or. I'm sorry this movie is much smarter and much better made than First Man! First Man Is Disappointing ~ and Boring. Aaaaand I subscribed to this channel. This video was entertaining as the movie itself. It captured the atmosphere and how everything came to be perfectly.
Watch free online apollo 13. Wondering which generation will see something this exciting. I hope to see the launch to Mars, or something memorable, at least once in my lifetime. Watch Apollo 13 movie beta ray bill Watch, Apollo~13~Onli`ne~Zstr"eam Watch Apollo full movie sub indonesia. Apollo 13 Image Library Figure Captions Copyright © 1996 by Eric M. Jones. All rights reserved. HTML Design by Brian W. Lawrence. Last revised 16 April 2016. No copyright is asserted for NASA photographs. If a recognizable person appears in a photo, use for commercial purposes may infringe a right of privacy or publicity. Photos may not be used to state or imply the endorsement by NASA or by any NASA employee of a commercial product, process or service, or used in any other manner that might mislead. Accordingly, it is requested that if a NASA photograph is used in advertising and other commercial promotion, layout and copy be submitted to NASA prior to release. NASA photos reproduced from this archive should include photo credit to "NASA" or "National Aeronautics and Space Administration" and should include scanning credit to the appropriate individuals or agencies as noted in the captions. Landing Site Maps/Images Preflight 1:25, 000 Map of Fra Mauro ( 7 Mb JPEG or 34 Mb) The grid lines in this large scale map are 250 meters apart. See, also, a geology version showing craters with their rims and ejecta blankets as well as depressions and ridges ( 4 Mb JPEG or 34 Mb). Traverse Map - versions from the Press Kit and Lovell's cuff checklist ( 0. 2 Mb) The seven planned sampling locations are: Valley (7 minutes), 1700 feet northeast of the LM before they start up Cone Ridge; Slope (10 minutes), 700 feet farther east and partway up slope on the flank of Cone Ridge; Cone (30 minutes) at two locations on the rim of Cone Crater; Flank Crater, 700 feet downslope from the Cone rim, same location as Apollo 14's planned Station D; Outpost (30 minutes) with details given three pages farther on in the checklist, similar location to Apollo 14 planned Station E; Weird Crater (15 minutes), same location as Apollo 14's planned Station F; Triplet Craters (7 minutes) same location as Apollo 14's planned Station G. Crew And Equipment Pre-Flight S69-60662 ( 46k) Original artwork for the Apollo 13 insignia/patch. Scan by NASA Johnson. S69-57057 ( 294k or 634k) Apollo 13 Training MESA. The strap attached at the center of the front edge secures the MESA table with one of the rock boxes visible in its stowage slot underneath. 1969. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57058 ( 298k or 653k) Apollo 13 Training MESA. The person on the right seems to be pointing to a sensor on or near the upper rock box. The TV camera is mounted upside down on a frame and is pre-pointed at the bottom of the ladder. In an April 2005 e-mail, Stan Lebar, the Westinghouse Lunar Camera Program Manager, notes that the camera on the training MESA in this series of photographs is a black&white camera. The flight MESA had a color TV camera. "There weren't very many flight units available for this type of use and I suspect that if they had a mockup, they would have used it in lieu of a flight model. Since the TV SEC (Secondary Electron Conduction) vidicon as used in Apollo 12 was replaced with a newly developed SIT (Silicon Intensifier Tube) on Apollo 14 to minimize the possibility of having a repeat of the Apollo 12 fiasco. We had only one CM and LM TV cameras upgraded with a SIT by then and I doubt if they would have chanced using either one of these flight models for this type of test. "To the right of the upper rock box, we see a pair of tongs and an extension handle. To the left of the lower rock box we see the geology hammer, a large scoop head, and the TV tripod. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57059 ( 202k or 440k) Apollo 13 Training MESA. View of the TV camera from the ladder side. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57060 ( 254k or 598k) Apollo 13 Training MESA. View of the upper rock box and an attached sensor. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57061 ( 272k or 594k) Apollo 13 Training MESA. View of two ECS LiOH canisters stowed in the lefthand face. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57062 ( 268k or 584k) Apollo 13 Training MESA. Hammer, scoop, TV tripod, lower rock box and details of the back of the TV camera restraints. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57063 ( 222k or 511k) Underside of the Apollo 13 Training MESA. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57064 ( 228k or 512k) Apollo 13 Training MESA. Underside and righthand face. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57065 ( 279k or 601k) Apollo 13 Training MESA on the left with some thermal blankets. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57066 ( 241k or 579k) Top right portion of the Apollo 13 Training MESA. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57067 ( 201k or 544k) Top portion of the Apollo 13 Training MESA with the TV camera. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57068 ( 285k or 599k) Lefthand portion of the Apollo 13 Training MESA. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57071 ( 257k or 621k) Wide view of the Apollo 13 Training MESA. The ETB is under the MESA table and covers the lower rock box. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57073 ( 238k or 574k) Apollo 13 Training MESA. MESA table re-positioned to allow removal of the rock boxes. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-57074 ( 220k or 609k) Apollo 13 Training MESA. TV camera, lower rock box, TV tripod. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-H-476 ( 132k or 1006k) Apollo-13 backup CMP Jack Swigert prepares to enter spacecraft for altitude chamber test at KSC. September 1969. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-477 ( 151k or 1152k) Apollo-13 backup astronauts John Young (left) and Jack Swigert in spacecraft during altitude chamber test at KSC. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S69-62224 ( 128k) The original Apollo 13 crew - Jim Lovell (left), Ken Mattingly, and Fred Haise - pose for a crew portrait. Note that Lovell does not have a distinguishing stripe on his arm at this time. December 1969. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S69-62231 ( 128k or 1384k) Alternate crew portrait. Scan by Kipp Teague. S69-62237 ( 119k) Portrait of CMP Ken Mattingly. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S69-62238 ( 128k) Portrait of LMP Fred Haise. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S69-62241 ( 126k) Formal Apollo 13 portrait of Jim Lovell. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-20253 ( 122k) Jim Lovell (left) points with his scoop while Fred Haise takes a documentation photograph during the December 17-20 field trip to Hawaii. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-20299 ( 136k) Fred Haise (left) and Jim Lovell during a geology training traverse at Kapoho, Hawaii. They have a Hand Tool Carrier (HTC), are wearing Hasselblads, and have radio aerials so they can talk to the geology support team practicing the Backroom role. 17-20 December 1969. Scan by J. L. Pickering. CM Training ( 115k) Ken Mattingly(left), Jim Lovell, and Fred Haise. Date unknown. Scan by Markus Mehring. KSC-69PC-574 ( 115k) Jim Lovell manipulates a piece of equipment on the top of the Central Station while Back-up Commander John Young (back to us at right center) watches. Harald Kucharek notes that Jim is wearing an EVA glove. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-69PC-577 ( 80k) Fred Haise (right) and his back-up, Charlie Duke, confer with a tech during training. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-24010 ( 144k) Jim Lovell (left) and Fred Haise during training. 17 January 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-31143 ( 93k) Fred Haise in a recovery raft during training, probably in an indoor pool. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-182 ( 103k or 823k) Ken Mattingly during egress training in a pool at MSC. Photo filed 17 January 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-24009 ( 99k) Fred Haise carries mock-ups of the ALSEP packages while in a harness attached to the arm of a large centrifuge. The harness is designed to reduce his apparent weight to one-sixth normal, giving a simulation of lunar conditions. 19 January 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-24012 ( 95k) Fred Haise in the centrifuge harness. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-9 ( 109k) Jim Lovell checks the gauntlet that will cover the lock rings that connect his glove to the suit. 28 January 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-29672 ( 163k or 1170k) Jim Lovell, who is carrying the ALSEP packages in the foreground, and Fred Haise, who is in the background with the Hand Tool Carrier (HTC), conduct a walk-through of EVA timeline at KSC. A Universal Handling Tool (UHT) sticks up on a diagonal out of each of the packages. In Lovell's flown cuff checklist, the UHTs are called 'putters', no doubt because of their resemblance golf 'putters'. The RTG package is on Jim's left. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-11 ( 96k) Fred Haise practices use of the Apollo Lunar Surface Close-up Camera, also known as the Gold Camera. Pickering. KSC-70PC-16 ( 11 Mb or 0. 25 Mb) NASA caption, 28 January 1970: "Fred W. Haise Jr., Apollo 13 Lunar Module Pilot, participated in a walk-through of the extravehicular activity timeline near the flight crew training building here today. In the foreground is the lunar surface tool carrier, topped by auger-like pipes, to be used with a motorized device to obtain soil sample cores in the Moon’s rugged Fra Mauro region. Apollo 13 is scheduled for launch from Complex 39’s Pad A no earlier than April 13. The other crew members are James A. Lovell, Jr., commander, and Thomas K. Mattingly II, Command Module pilot. " Note that Haise has a 16-mm DAC movie camera mounted on his RCU bracket. The featureless box mounted on the camera of Haise's right is a battery for the DAC. Scan courtesy Margaret Persinger, KSC. KSC-70P-46 ( 132k) Fred Haise works with the drill. Jim Lovell is holding a Hasselblad camera. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-29673 ( 170k or 1132k) Fred Haise works with the drill. The drill-stem rack is in the foreground. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-13 ( 152k) Fred Haise has a Universal Handling Tool (UHT) in his right hand. The drill is at his right and drill stem rack is at his left. On the Moon, Fred plans to drill to two holes to the heat flow experiment and one core hole. In drilling the core hole, he uses six 42. 5-cm stem, emplacing one stem and then attaching the next before extracting the entire string. Here, he has evidently just drawn the string out of the buried container which contains lunar soil simulant. As Dave Scott discovered on Apollo 15, lunar soil is more compact than expected at depth and extraction of the core was extremely difficult. Later crews had a jack and treadle to help with the extraction. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-12 ( 144k or 353k) Jim Lovell (left) and Fred Haise pose at the foot of a LM simulator. Jim has tongs attached to his yo-yo. Note that the lettering on Lovell's RCU, reading "J. Lovell", is in red while the lettering on Haise's RCU, reading "F. Haise", is in black. The MESA is visible behind Jim and appears to be completely unloaded. Research by J. Pickering. KSC-70PC-15 ( 172k) Apollo 13 Commander Jim Lovell carries the ALSEP packages during training at the Cape. Fred Haise is in the background at the left, apparently walking out from the training building. The RTG pallet is on Lovell's left. Note the locking mechanism with which the pallets are secured to the carrybar and, also, the Universal Handling Tool (UHT) attached to each of the pallets. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-70PC-16 ( 120k) Apollo 13 Commander Jim Lovell prepares to use the 'crank' to adjust the erectable S-Band antenna pointing, probably first in elevation. Scan courtesy Margaret Persinger, KSC. KSC-70PC-18 ( 144k or 800k) Close-up of Fred Haise during training. Ulli Lotzmann calls attention to the fact that Fred is using a RCU-mounted Data Acquisition Camera (DAC). RCU mounting brackets for DAC cameras were flown on all the missions from Apollo 13 to Apollo 17, but the only training photos of RCU-mounted DACs are from Apollo 13. This image also gives us an excellent view of Fred's spiral-bound cuff checklist. A page in Jim Lovell's cuff checklist for activities at 1+00 into the EVA indicates that Fred sent a DAC out from the cabin in the ETB. Jim then mounted the DAC on his RCU to film Fred's egress. Item 155 in the Apollo 13 CM launch stowage list is "Camera/Power Pack Assy 16MH L. S. ", which is clearly a battery-powered DAC configured for use on the lunar surface. Pickering. KSC-70PC-19 ( 108k) Close-up of Fred Haise during training at the Cape. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-103 ( 97k) Fred Haise extracts the fuel element for the SNAP-26 RTG from its cask mounted on the side of the LM. 3 February 1970. Photo filed Scan by Frederic Artner. 70-HC-73 ( 88k or 753k) Jim Lovell takes a picture to document the deployed configuration of the ALSEP. Both the RTG and Central Station are visible in his visor. Photo filed 3 February 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-74 ( 124k or 960k) Excellent view of Jim Lovell's chest-mounted Hasselblad camera during EVA training. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-75 ( 120k or 964k) A technician appears to be adjusting Fred Haise's LEVA (Lunar Extravehicular Visor Assembly) during EVA training. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-77 ( 220k or 1486k) Jim Lovell appears to be releasing Boyd bolt on the ALSEP Central Station. Once all of the bolts are released, the top will spring up. The RTG is behind Jim on the righthand side of the photo. In this image, we can see that the nametag on the left front of the RCU has red letters and, from other pictures in this sequence, we know that Jim's lettering is red while Fred's is black. Note the pattern of Velcro strips on the top of Jim's OPS, particularly the short strip just forward of the antenna, which can be used to identify him when other clues are not available. In this and the following images, Jim has his side visors up. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-80 ( 204k or 1657k) Fred Haise positions the drill stem rack during training. The battery-powered drill is at his left and a buried can filled with lunar soil simulant is on the righthand side of the picture. Note the wide pitch - perhaps 1 cm - of the thread on the drill stems. Fred has his watch on his right arm and, as can be seen in good detail in this photo, a spiral-bound checklist on his left wrist. A Universal Handling Tool (UHT) is attached to the yo-yo at his waist. Note the pattern of Velcro strips on the top of his OPS and the fact that he has his side visors down. Note, also, that Fred's OPS antenna has a red color, whereas Jim's in prior images had a silver color. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-H-293 ( 87k) Benchtop photo of the 16-mm Data Acquisition Camera (DAC). The attached battery pack is underneath the camera in this shot. Pickering. 70-HC-81 ( 172k or 1079k) Fred Haise (right) and a technician or engineer work with the drill. Fred has his right foot on the treadle. Jim Lovell has a Data Acquisition Camera in his left hand and has the Hand Tool Carrier (HTC) at his right hand. A detail shows the tops of their OPSs. Note the different patterns of Velcro strips on the tops of their OPSs, the antenna colors and the different configuration of hoses and coverings on their right side of their OPSs. The lettering on Jim's RCU nametag definitely is red. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-83 ( 136k or 962k) Fred Haise (foreground left) and Jim Lovell separate core stem sections using a hand wrench. Jim's yo-yo is clearly visible on his left hip and, as indicated in a detail, we have a clear view of the curved armband and spiral binding of the cuff checklist. The set of five small objects visible between his hands are core stem caps. The different colors of the OPS antennas is clear in this picture. Note that Fred has the DAC mounted on his RCU and that there is a tempa-label on the handle of his UHT. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-84 ( 128k or 947k) Fred Haise (red antenna, facing us) and Jim Lovell with the Hand Tool Carrier (HTC). Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-70PC-0016 ( 120k) Jim Lovell (left) aligns the high-gain antenna while Fred Haise works at the ALSEP Bay. 4 February 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. Flag Deployment ( 126k) Jim Lovell practices flag deployment. Pickering. S70-27034 ( 3. 3 Mb) Fred Haise carries the Solar Wind Collector (SWC) during training. Note the black strap on Haise's right forearm. Note, also, that Fred has a 16-mm Data Acquisition Camera (DAC) mounted on his RCU. Scan courtesy NASA Johnson. S70-27038 ( 172k) Jim Lovell and Fred Haise appear to be opening the large sample bag that fits in the center of the Hand Tool Carrier at the left. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-27037 ( 108k or 585k) Jim Lovell collects a sample with the tongs during training. The Hand Tool Carrier is behind him at the right and the Central Station and other ALSEP instruments are behind him at the left. The reflection in Jim's visor indicates that Fred Haise took this picture. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-70PC-62 ( 216k or 578k) Apollo 13 Backup Commander John Young practices trenching at the Cape. The type of long-handled scoop shown here was never used on the Moon. The Apollo Lunar Surface Close-up Camera is to the right of the gnomon. Note that John does not have distinguishing stripes on his suit at this time. 19 February 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-70PC-63 ( 0. 3 Mb or 2. 8 Mb) Side view of John Young trenching at the Cape, with Charlie Duke watching. Note that Charlie appears to have a battery-powered DAC mounted on his RCU. Scan courtesy Maggie Persinger, KSC. KSC-70PC-67 ( 0. 9 Mb) John Young (left) pours a sample into a 'Dixie Cup' sample bag in a holder on the Hand Tool Carrier (HTC). Charlie Duke may be taking a cross-Sun "after". Note that John does not have distinguishing stripes on his suit. Scan courtesy Maggie Persinger, KSC. 70-H-259 ( 111k or 797k) Jim Lovell (left), Ken Mattingly, and Fred Haise climb into a Command Module mock-up for egress training in the Gulf of Mexico. Photo filed 24 February 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-24767 ( 194k) Jim Lovell (left), Ken Mattingly, and Fred Haise climb into a Command Module mock-up for egress training aboard 'Retriever'. 24 February 1970. Pickering. S70-25623 ( 137k) Fred Haise (left), Jim Lovell, and Ken Mattingly aboard 'Retriever'. Pickering. S70-25628 ( 143k) Fred Haise (left), Ken Mattingly, and Jim Lovell aboard 'Retriever'. Pickering. S70-25634 ( 143k) Jim Lovell poses in an oxygen mask aboard 'Retriever'. Pickering. 70-H-257 ( 89k or 675k) Apollo 13 water egress training in Gulf of Mexico. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-30579 ( 114k or 771k) The Lovell Family: Barbara (born 13 October 1953), Marilyn, Jeffrey (born 14 January 1966), Jim, and Susan ( born 14 July 1958). Son Jay (born 15 February 1955) was a student at St. John's Military Academy in Wisconsin and wasn't present for the photo session. March 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-30534 ( 72k) View of the Lunar Landing Training Vehicle. 9 March 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-HC-300 ( 132k or 1151k) Jim Lovell celebrates his 42nd birthday. This is the earliest picture currently in the ALSJ that shows Jim with red stripes on his suit. Photo filed 25 March 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-H-444 ( 95k) Jim Lovell examines a large birthday card. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-445 ( 95k) Jim Lovell serves pieces of his birthday cake. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-446 ( 86k) Ken Mattingly suited up prior to the Countdown Demonstration Test. Photo filed 26 March 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-HC-292 ( 140k or 1278k) The Apollo 13 crew walks to the transfer van prior to the Countdown Demonstration Test. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-H-450 ( 86k) In the White Room, Pad Leader Guenter Wendt jokes with a member of the Apollo 13 crew while Jim Lovell (center) watches. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70P-130 ( 86k) Fred Haise (left), Jim Lovell, and Ken Mattingly board the transfer van after the successful completion of the Countdown Demonstration Test. 26 March 1970. Scan courtesy NASA KSC. S70-32726 ( 1. 5 Mb or 141k) The Apollo lens brush was first flown on Apollo 13 and, on the later missions was used on Hasselblads and TV lenses to good effect. The bristles were made of an unidentified soft hair to avoid scratching the lenses. Photo logged 27 March 1970. Scan courtesy Susan Phipps, NASA Johnson. NoID-PLSS ( 124k) Pre-flight views of the back of Fred Haise's PLSS (left) and, presumably, the front of Jim Lovell's (right). 3 April 1970. Pickering. KSC-70PC-70 ( 104k) Jim Lovell poses at the launch pad. 6 April 1970. Pickering. KSC-70PC-71 ( 112k) Fred Haise poses at the launch pad. Pickering. KSC-70PC-72 ( 100k) Ken Mattingly poses at the launch pad. Pickering. KSC-70PC-73 ( 144k) Fred Haise (left) Jim Lovell, and Ken Mattingly pose in front of the launch pad. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-H-621 ( 135k or 839k) Fred Haise (left) Jim Lovell, and Ken Mattingly pose in front of the launch pad. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-474 ( 104k or 869k) Fred Haise (left) and Jim Lovell walk out to their T-38 aircraft at Patrick AFB. Photo dated 8 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-472 ( 87k or 669k) Jim Lovell prepares to take off in T-38 aircraft during training at Patrick AFB. Photo dated 6 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-76 ( 156k) Fred Haise works in the LM simulator. The Environmental Control System (ECS) is on the righthand side of the image. 7 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-467 ( 142k or 1010k) Jim Lovell descends from the Command Module simulator at KSC. Photo dated 7 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-473 ( 111k or 854k) Fred Haise prepares to take off in T-38 aircraft at Patrick AFB. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-475 ( 98k) Jack Swigert sits in a pristine space suit. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-78 ( 156k) Deke Slayton (yellow shirt), Jim Lovell, and Ken Mattingly listen to Jack Swigert. 9 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-724 ( 116k) Fred Haise (left), Jack Swigert, and Jim Lovell pose on the day before launch. Swigert had just replaced Ken Mattingly as CMP after Mattingly was exposed to German Measles. Photo dated 10 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-HC-541 ( 140k or 1136k) Fred Haise (left), Jack Swigert, and Jim Lovell pose on the day before launch. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-34767 ( 228k or 935k) Jack Swigert, Jim Lovell, and Fred Haise pose on the day before launch. 10 April 1970. Research by Ed Hengeveld. S70-36485 ( 119k) Jim Lovell (left), Jack Swigert, and Fred Haise pose on the day before launch. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-492 ( 212k) Fred Haise (left), Jim Lovell, and Jack Swigert, at breakfast on launch day. Photo filed 11 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-494 ( 116k or 943k) Fred Haise (left) and Jim Lovell during pre-launch breakfast. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. NoID-Swigert ( 96k) Jack Swigert at breakfast on launch day. 11 April 1970. Pickering. 70-HC-429 ( 72k or 585k) Jim Lovell's suit. Note the covers protecting the neck and wrist rings. Photo dated 11 April 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-34848 ( 108k) Jim Lovell during suit-up on launch day. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-HC-329 ( 120k or 1052k) Jim Lovell during suit-up. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-H-501 ( 89k or 736k) Jim Lovell during suit-up. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-34849 ( 78k) Jack Swigert during suit-up. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-34850 ( 90k) 70-H-503 ( 125k or 929k) Jack Swigert during suit-up. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-496 ( 126k or 914k) S70-34851 ( 115k) Fred Haise and a tech check comm during suit-up. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-502 ( 100k or 805k) Fred Haise during suit-up. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-499 ( 116k) The Apollo 13 crewmembers prepare to leave the suit-up room. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-497 ( 211k) NASA caption: "Astronaut secretary Martha Caballero wishing Apollo 13 commander James A. Lovell, Jr. good luck. " Photo dated 11 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-500 ( 87k) Jim Lovell leads Fred Haise and Jack Swigert to the transfer van. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-498 ( 111k) The Apollo 13 crewmembers make their way to the Transfer Van for the trip out to the launch pad. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-495 ( 126k or 1008k) Jim Lovell leads Jack Swigert and Fred Haise to the Transfer van. Deke Slayton is behind and to the left of Haise. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-105 ( 99k) The Apollo 13 crew at the base of the launch tower. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-111 ( 99k) Guenter Wendt, seated at the Command Module hatch, signals to the crew. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-31774 ( 72k or 434k) An artist's fanciful view of the Apollo 13 crew working on the lunar surface. Among other problems: (1) stars are not readily seen in the daylight lunar sky by either the human eye or a camera because of the brightness of the sunlight surface; (2) the streaks in the sky are highly implausible; (3) no Apollo Commander would have landed in a place with a rocky outcrop so short a distance downrange; and, (4) it would have been extremely difficult for an astronaut in a pressurized Apollo suit to climb up on a rock as shown here. Scan by Kipp Teague. Apollo 13 Plaque ( 82k) This is a facsimile of the replacement plaque flown on the mission - possibly in the LM cabin as shown in the Ron Howard film Apollo 13. Scan by Frederic Artner. Vehicle Assembly, Transport and Launch Pad Preps 69-H-1791 ( 140k) Apollo 13 CSM in Assembly and Test. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-69P-683 ( 158k) Apollo 13 Saturn V with boilerplate spacecraft during transfer move from High Bay 2 to High Bay 3. 8 August 1969. Pickering. Roll-Around ( 120k) KSC-69P-684 ( 140k) 69-HC-1048 ( 136k or 853k) Two views of LM-7 being moved from altitude chamber to low bay work stand at Manned Spacecraft Operations Building at the Cape. Photo dated 10 October 1969. Scan by Kipp Teague. 69-HC-1260 ( 148k or 986k) The third stage adapter is lowered into place over the Lunar Module during stacking in the VAB. Scan by Kipp Teague. 69-H-1792 ( 115k) Apollo 13 command-and-service module being moved to integrated workstand for final mating to spacecraft launch adapter. Photo dated 10 December 1969. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 69-HC-1148 ( 200k or 1432k) Apollo 13 spacecraft before mating to launch vehicle in VAB. Scan by Kipp Teague. 69-HC-1147 ( 176k or 1569k) Apollo 13 Saturn V in VAB during mating of spacecraft. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-69PC-820 ( 92k or 1001k) Apollo 13 bathed in floodlight during early-morning rollout. 16 December 1969. Pickering. 69-H-1911 ( 58k) Apollo 13 Saturn V during rollout. Photo dated 16 December 1969. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 69-HC-1268 ( 120k or 1032k) Apollo 13 Saturn V during rollout. Scan by Kipp Teague. 69-H-1909 ( 74k) 69-H-1906 ( 132k or 1204k) Apollo 13 Saturn V during rollout. Scan by????. KSC-69PC-825 ( 176k or 1267k) Apollo 13 Saturn V during rollout. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-69PC-826 ( 109k or 375k) Apollo 13 Saturn V during rollout. Pickering. 69-H-1908 ( 136k) Apollo 13 rollout. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 69-HC-1269 ( 116k or 1093k) Apollo 13 Saturn V on pad 39A after rollout. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-32990 ( 148k or 277k) Apollo 13 on the pad. 24 March 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-32989 ( 68k) Apollo 13 on the pad. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-442 ( 188k) The crawler is moved into position under the Mobile service Structure. Photo dated 24 March 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. 70-H-448 ( 140k) The Mobile Service Structure approaches the Apollo 13 spacecraft from the right. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-68 ( 136k or 290k) The Apollo 13 CSM and Escape Tower from the Mobile Service Structure. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-536 ( 176k or 1213k) The Apollo 13 CSM and Escape Tower from the Mobile Service Structure. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-537 ( 92k or 836k) The Apollo 13 stack from the Mobile Service Structure. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-289 ( 120k) Liquid Oxygen vents from Apollo 13 during a Countdown Demonstration Test. Pickering. KSC-70C-1049 ( 136k or 1323k) The Apollo 13 CSM and Escape Tower from the Mobile Service Structure. 25 March 1970. Pickering. 70-HC-351 ( 152k or 1227k) View of Apollo 13 Saturn V from the tower during Countdown Demonstration Test. Photo dated 25 March 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-HC-291 ( 52k or 671k) Nighttime view of Apollo 13 Saturn V on pad during Countdown Demonstration Test. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-H-447 ( 148k) View of Apollo 13 from the Mobile Service Structure. Photo dated 31 March 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70C-1491 ( 93k or 871k) Apollo 13 Saturn V on the pad at dusk. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-70C-1492 ( 203k) Apollo 13 Saturn V on the pad enclosed in the Mobile Service Structure (MSS). Pickering. KSC-70C-1499 ( 156k or 1211k) Apollo 13 Saturn V viewed from the Mobile Service Structure during MSS rollback. Pickering. KSC-70C-1490 ( 108k or 863k) Apollo 13 silhouetted by sunset following MSS pullback. Pickering. KSC-70C-1494 ( 176k or 1044k) Apollo 13 on pad at sunset following MSS pullback. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-70PC-104 ( 302k) Apollo 13 ready for launch. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-70PC-43 ( 380k) Apollo 13 Saturn V on the launch pad at sunset. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-70PC-176 ( 141k or 295k) Apollo 13 Saturn V spotlit on the launch pad. Scan by Kipp Teague. Saturn V Launch KSC-70PC-178 ( 187k or 403k) Apollo 13 launch. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-34747 ( 126k or 295k) Apollo 13 launch. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-34853 ( 96k) KSC-70PC-160 ( 92k or 300k) Apollo 13 launch. Pickering. KSC-70PC-159 ( 160k) Apollo 13 yaws away from the launch tower during lift-off. It has risen about one quarter of its own height. Pickering. KSC-70PC-107 ( 131k or 295k) Apollo 13 yaws away from the launch tower during lift-off. It has risen about half its own height. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-34747 ( 124k) Apollo 13 lift-off during the yaw maneuver from a different perspective. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-34855 ( 131k or 156k) Apollo 13 clears the tower. Scan by Kipp Teague. In-Flight Photos S70-35139 ( 132k) Gene Kranz, with his back to us, at right center watches a TV transmission from the Apollo 13 crew moments before the accident that crippled the mission. Fred Haise can be seen on the large screen at the upper right. 13 April 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-34986 ( 136k or 657k) (NASA Caption) "A group of eight astronauts and flight controllers monitor the console activity in the Mission Operations Control Room (MOCR) of the Mission Control Center (MCC) during the Apollo 13 lunar landing mission. Seated, left to right, are MOCR Guidance Officer Raymond F. Teague; Astronaut Edgar D. Mitchell, and Astronaut Alan B. Shepard Jr., Standing, left to right, are Scientist-Astronaut Anthony W. England; Astronaut Joe H. Engle; Astronaut Eugene A. Cernan; Astronaut Ronald E. Evans; and M. P. Frank, a flight controller. When this picture was made, the Apollo 13 moon landing had already been cancelled, and the Apollo 13 crewmen were in transearth trajectory attempting to bring their crippled spacecraft back home. " Mitchell and Shepard, along with Stu Roosa, are the Apollo 14 Prime Crew and Cernan, Evans, and Engle the Apollo 14 Back-up Crew. Tony England, who confirmed the following in a January 2006 e-mail, was to have been the Apollo 13 EVA CapCom; and later, at the request of John Young who was the Backup Commander on Apollo 13, Tony served with distinction as Mission Scientist and EVA CapCom on Apollo 16. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-35583 ( 164k) Standing in front of the Apollo 9 CM at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Reginald Turnhill of the BBC makes a tape for TV transmission back to his home country during the Apollo 13 mission.. Pickering. Kipp Teague has posted unprocessed, high-resolution scans provided by NASA Johnson of all the Apollo Hasselblad images. The scans are available at AS13-59-8484 ( 1. 2 Mb) Jim Lovell in the LM, preparing it for jettison. Journal Contributor Mike Poliszuk notes that the DSKY display, visible to the right of Jim's elbow, shows "his computer is in 'Poo', i. e. Program 00, idling. It is powered on but not doing anything. See an enhanced detail from the high resolution scan. Apollo 13 is the only Apollo flight in which interior shots were taken with a Hasselblad with a Reseau plate installed. This camera would have been used for EVA shots had they landed. " Scan courtesy Kipp Teague. AS13-59-8490/1 Red-Blue Anaglyph ( 20k) Red-blue anaglyph by Erik van Meijgaarden. AS13-59-8491 ( 84k) 16-mm camera and magazine in the purse. Scan by Ulli Lotzmann. AS13-60-8591 ( 161k) View of Earth. Scan by Kipp Teague. Journal Contributor Paul White has made detailed comparisons of cloud patterns seen in a large number of Apollo images with imagery taken at close to the same time by various meteorlogical satellites. AS13-61-8727 ( 100k) View thru the LM rendezvous window of the Moon beyond the Command Module. Scan by Kipp Teague. AS13-62-8885 ( 116k or 817k) View of the Moon out a LM window. Scan courtesy NASA Johnson. AS13-62-8909 ( 196k or 1046k) View of the Moon out a LM window. Journal Contributor Danny Caes writes, "The two major craters in this photograph are Chaplygin (just left of centre), and Schliemann (below centre). " Scan courtesy NASA Johnson. AS13-62-8922 ( 92k) Oblique view of the lunar farside. Scan by Kipp Teague. AS13-62-8988 ( 128kk) Lovell asleep in the LM, wearing his EVA boots. Scan by Ulli Lotzmann. S70-35013 ( 137k or 954k) Deke Slayton (check jacket) shows the adapter devised to make use of square Command Module lithium hydroxide canisters to remove excess carbon dioxide from the Apollo 13 LM cabin. As detailed in Lost Moon by Jim Lovell and Jeffrey Kluger, the adapter was devised by Ed Smylie. From left to right, members of Slayton's audience are Flight Director Milton L. Windler, Deputy Director/Flight Operations Howard W. Tindall, Director/Flight Operations Sigurd A Sjoberg, Deputy Director/Manned Spaceflight Center Christopher C. Kraft, and Director/Manned Spaceflight Center Robert R. Gilruth. 15 April 1970. Scan by Eric Jones. AS13-62-8929 ( 162k or 583k) Inflight photo of the device constructed by the crew from duct tape, maps and other materials they had on hand as per instructions provided by Houston. This device allowed use of box-shaped Command Module lithium hydroxide canisters in conjunction with the LM Environmental Control system, which is the large white unit that fills most of the frame. The LM LiOH canisters were cylindrical in shape and fit into the receptacles at the lower left. Compare with the LM-ECS diagram ( 245k). Scan by John Fongheiser. AS13-62-9004 ( 144k or 682k) Interior view of the Apollo 13 Lunar Module (LM) during the trouble-plagued journey back to Earth. This photograph shows some of the temporary hose connections and apparatus which were necessary when the three astronauts moved form the Command Module to use the LM as a 'lifeboat'. Astronaut John L. Swigert Jr., command module pilot, is on the right. On the left, an astronauts holds in his right hand the feed water bag from the Portable Life Support System (PLSS). It is connected to a hose (in center) from the Lunar Topographic (Hycon) camera. In the background is the 'mail box', a jerry-rigged arrangement which the Apollo 13 astronauts built to use the Command Module lithium hydroxide canisters to purge carbon dioxide from the Lunar Module. Lithium hydroxide is used to scrub CO2 from the spacecraft's atmosphere. Since there was a limited amount of lithium hydroxide in the LM, this arrangement was rigged up to utilize the canisters from the CM. The "mail box" was designed and tested on the ground at the Manned Spacecraft Center before it was suggested to the Apollo 13 crewmen. Because of the explosion of one of the oxygen tanks in the Service Module, the three crewmen had to use the LM as a 'lifeboat'. NASA caption. Scan by Kipp Teague. AS13-60-8591 ( 68k) View of Earth from Apollo 13. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-35368 ( 133k or 1386k) Mission Control during final 24 hours of Apollo 13 mission. April 16, 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. AS13-59-8500 ( 55k or 415k) View of the severely damaged Service Module after separation. 17 April 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. AS13-59-8562 ( 104k) View of the top of Apollo 13 Lunar Module Aquarius after separation. The plus-Z strut with the ladder attached is at the bottom of the image. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-35652 ( 76k) The Apollo 13 Command Module approaches splashdown. Scan by Kipp Teague. KSC-70PC-121 ( 90k) Apollo 13 splashdown. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-15870 ( 105k) Recovery and Post-flight Photos 70-HC-482 ( 136k or 1201k) Apollo 13 recovery operations. Photo dated 17 April 1970. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-35631 ( 98k) Jim Lovell (center) gestures in the recovery raft while a Navy diver positions the lift cage. Fred Haise is on the left side of the raft with Jack Swigert partly hidden beyond him. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-256 ( 139k) Jack Swigert is raised to the recovery helicopter after splashdown. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. KSC-70PC-0130 ( 57k) Fred Haise (left), Jim Lovell, and Jack Swigert emerge from the recovery helicopter on-board the aircraft carrier Iwo Jima. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-35145 ( 104k or 257k) Mission Control in Houston celebrates the safe return of the Apollo 13 crew. Gene Kranz is smoking a celebratory cigar at the right while Deke Slayton, in front of the mission patch, shakes hands. Scan by Kipp Teague. 70-H-652 ( 186k or 1288k) Navy helicopters lowers net to pick up rescue swimmers of U. Navy Underwater Demolition team. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-35606 ( 160k or 393k) Rear Admiral Donald C. Davis (USN), Recovery Task Force Commander, welcomes Fred Haise (left), Jack Swigert, and Jim Lovell aboard the U. Iwo Jima after their safe return to Earth. Scan by Kipp Teague. S70-15520 ( 261k) Jim Lovell (left), Fred Haise, and Jack Swigert receive a phone call on board the Iwo Jima. The fact that it is a group call and that a photo was taken suggest that the call is from President Nixon. Pickering. S70-15653 ( 248k) Navy divers pose with the Command Module before it is hoisted aboard the Iwo Jima. Pickering. S70-15841 ( 193k) S70-16000 ( 224k) Navy divers prepare the Command Module for hoisting. Pickering. S70-35632 ( 216k) The Apollo 13 Command Module being hosted aboard the Iwo Jima. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-15531 ( 104k) The Apollo 13 Command Module after being hosted aboard the Iwo Jima. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-15507 ( 209k) Jack Swigert (left) and Jim Lovell examine the Command Module aboard the Iwo Jima. Pickering. S70-15961 ( 214k) Interior of the Command Module during inspection onboard the Iwo Jima. April 1970. Pickering. S70-15501 ( 109k) Jim Lovell reads a newspaper account of the Apollo 13 recovery. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-16004 ( 297k) Jim Lovell and Jack Swigert at dinner on the Iwo Jima. Pickering. S70-16007 ( 297k) Jim Lovell at dinner on the Iwo Jima. Pickering. S70-15511 ( 112k) U. President Richard Nixon (right) welcomes the Apollo 13 crew safely home. Jack Swigert is at the left, then Fred Haise, and Jim Lovell. 18 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-15526 ( 132k) Fred Haise (left), Jim Lovell, President Nixon, and Jack Swigert at Hickham Air Force Base, Hawaii. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-15762 ( 193k) Jim Lovell (left), Jack Swigert, and Fred Haise at Hickham Air Force Base, Hawaii. Pickering. S70-35747 ( 72k) Jim Lovell (left), Jack Swigert, and Fred Haise in Houston. 20 April 1970. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-35748 ( 71k) Deke Slayton (center foreground), Jim Lovell (left rear), Jack Swigert (center rear), and Fred Haise (center right) meet with Wernher von Braun in Houston. Scan by Ed Hengeveld. S70-51890 ( 168k) Apollo astronauts and Soyuz 9 crew at a backyard party: (left-to-right) Armstrong, Aldrin, Anders, Nikolayev, McDivitt, Conrad, Cunningham, Stafford, Swigert, Gordon, Schweickart, Scott, Lovell, Slayton, Sevastyanov. 1970. Photo research by Jim Murray and Peter Duncan. Scan by Kipp Teague. 21st Astronautical Congress ( 2. 8 Mb) This article was published in the Augsburger Allgemeine of 9 Ocgtober 1970 and is used with permission. Scan by Klaus Zeitner, who also provided a translation into English. S71-52266 ( 100k or 566k) Jack Swigert poses with a LM model. December 1971. Scan by Kipp Teague. Splashdown Location ( 750k) This Mike Dinne was the Deputy Director at NASA's Honeysuckle Creek Tracking Station during Apollo and provides a scan of a map he used during Apollo 13. It shows the post-launch Rev 1 and 2 ground tracks for launches at the beginning and end of the launch window. An on-time launch would have left the Cape on an azimuth of 72 degrees while a launch at the end of the window would have left on an azimuth of 96 degrees. Apollo 13 launched on time. Mike marked the splashdown location soon after the crew was safely recovered. Jim Lovell's EV Gloves ( 38k) This Ulrich Lotzmann photo shows the gloves on display at the Adler Planetarium in Chicago. Jim Lovell's left EVA Glove, Cuff Checklist, and LEVA ( 1. 3 Mb) Jim Lovell's flown LEVA, photographed at the Adler Planetarium by Arthur de Wolf This version of the LEVA was first flown on Apollo 13 and included a central eyeshade with a raisable flap. It also included what is known as the 'CDR stripe' introduced at the request of NASA Public Affairs to distinguish between the two LM crewmembers in photographs. On later missions, the stripe was solid red. Lovell obtained NASA permission to incorporate a US Navy anchor on his CDR stripe.
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